The Origin of the Autonomous Community of Castile and León (Part II)

April 24, 1977 was the date we had reached as we reviewed the contemporary history of Castile and León. That day, under a cloudy sky, regionalists celebrated in Villalar de los Comuneros that Castile and León was finally capable of self-governance after a long time. The satisfaction of having created the Commonwealth of Castilian-Leonese Provincial Councils was reason enough for a jota performed by Nuevo Mester de Juglaría or a good swig from the wineskin. On the stage of the meadow, the influence of the upcoming June elections could be heard in the political speeches; regardless of the speaker's ideology, everyone agreed that Castile and León needed more autonomy. The Commonwealth had just been created and already felt insufficient. The following nationally broadcast video helps set the scene of that electoral moment:

On June 15, 1977, in a joyful atmosphere, with everyone singing Libertad, libertad and the like — very much in the style of Cuéntame — Spaniards voted with complete independence for the first time since the Second Republic. The party chosen by the majority was the UCD (for younger readers: Union of the Democratic Centre), led by Adolfo Suárez from Cebreros, with 34% of the vote; followed by the PSOE, led by the very young Felipe González, with 29%. In Castile and León, UCD's victory was even more overwhelming, winning a broad majority over the PSOE and the very minor Alianza Popular. The PCE did not obtain any seats in our region. In Ávila, the UCD swept the board and won all three of the province's possible seats, which makes sense considering Adolfo was from the area and even had a football stadium named after him.

November 1976. Adolfo Suárez at the Adolfo Suárez

Four days later, the Constituent Legislature began. While the new Constitution was being drafted, Catalan and Basque deputies and senators grouped themselves into regional parliamentary assemblies. Since they had just been elected by the people, they considered themselves the legitimate representatives of their respective regions, and it was with them that the Government had to negotiate pre-autonomy. They were quickly imitated by the rest of the Spanish regions. In the case of Castile and León, the process was slower and more complex. A first meeting was held in Madrid with deputies and senators from the Castilian area (León, Old Castile, and New Castile), where it was decided that the two Castiles should be separate — despite a few advocates for a Greater Castile — and that the challenge of determining Madrid’s status fell exclusively to New Castile. Based on that, meetings between parliamentarians from León and Old Castile focused on defining the territory of the new Castilian-Leonese community. Logroño was in the process of changing the name of its province to La Rioja and requested to become a single-province autonomous community. The deputies from Santander were divided, even within the same political parties: half wanted to join Castile and León, while the other half preferred their province to stand alone. Finally, León, confident in its own identity, remained cautious. Still, since the new Constitution had not yet been finalized and experts speculated that creating new single-province autonomous communities would be very difficult, the three reluctant provinces participated — even if only symbolically — in the establishment of the Assembly of Parliamentarians and Provincial Deputies of Castile and León, which took place in Valladolid four months after the elections, on October 31, 1977.

Idea of Greater Castile

The next step was for the Government to recognize the Assembly and grant it pre-autonomy. After months of negotiations, in June 1978, the Government approved pre-autonomy for Castile and León through Royal Decree-Law 20/1978. This decree established that the power of the Castilian-Leonese people resided in a sort of proto-parliament called the General Council of Castile and León, composed of one representative from each Provincial Council and four parliamentarians per province — three from the most voted party and one from the minority (resulting in: 32 councillors from the UCD, 7 from the PSOE, and 1 independent from Soria). From this Council, a Council of Ministers would be chosen to hold executive power. The decree also stated that pre-autonomy was initially granted to the eleven provinces of León and Old Castile, but that parliamentarians in each province had to decide by a two-thirds majority whether to join the pre-autonomy process. León, Logroño, and Santander voted against, and since the Spanish Government refused to recognize additional pre-autonomous entities, they were excluded from the process.

On July 22, at the Monzón de Campos Castle, the General Council of Castile and León was formally constituted. The leaders of Palencia’s Provincial Council, aware of the historic moment, decorated the castle for the event. Ministers, intellectuals, and members of non-represented political parties such as the PCE, PTE, or PANCAL attended; no one came from León, Logroño, or Santander. The President of the Council of Ministers — the first president of an autonomous Castile and León — was elected. The chosen one was Juan Manuel Reol Tejada (UCD), who we had already encountered in our regional history as the man being booed in the Villalar video from the first part. The members of Regional Alliance and the Regional Institute, so active earlier in the story, acknowledged that from this moment on, the politicians were the ones to lead the drive for autonomy.

The next meeting took place at the Palacio de la Salina in Salamanca. In this meeting, a Council of Ministers was formed based on consensus, with the first vice-presidency going to a PSOE councillor and almost one-third of the ministries also in PSOE hands. The apparent unity of the General Council collapsed when the first controversial issue was addressed: which city would be the capital of Castile and León. Some proposed Valladolid, but representatives from Burgos, Salamanca, Segovia, etc., refused, considering it a new form of centralism. Another option was Tordesillas, the logistical centre of the region, but it was dismissed as being a “camouflaged” Valladolid. Burgos, as the “Head of Castile,” argued it should be the capital, but the southern provinces rejected it as being too peripheral. The most popular proposal was Palencia, but to avoid conflict from the very first meeting, it was decided that the capital would be located in the city where the President of the Council came from (in this case, Burgos); likewise, the headquarters of each ministry would be located in the home province of its holder. Thus, Segovia became the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior and Ávila of the Ministry of Education.

General Council of Castile and León, July 1978

Over time, the situation within the Council became increasingly tense. New disputes arose over the flag, the role of the provincial councils — the UCD supported the commonwealth model, while the PSOE wanted them abolished — or over the powers to be obtained. In truth, the only reason things didn’t escalate further was because the councillors, being mostly deputies, were focused on the debates over the new Constitution, leaving minimal time for regional autonomy matters. The time between meetings stretched out, and with few agreements or advances, autumn arrived — and with it, the Constitution, which was approved by the Cortes on October 31 and ratified by the Spanish people in a referendum on December 6. As usual, voter turnout in Castile and León was above the national average.

The Constitution coined the term Autonomous Communities, territorial entities with powers similar to those of the states of a federal country, but without forming a federation — something expressly prohibited in Article 145.1. As Autonomous Communities were a completely new concept and none yet existed, the Constitution also laid down the rules for their creation. First, if provinces wished to constitute themselves as an Autonomous Community, they had to be contiguous and share historical, cultural, and economic ties. Then, each one, individually, had to take certain steps to confirm its adhesion.

The problem was that the Constitution provided two possible paths. One was simple (Article 143): within six months, the Provincial Council and two-thirds of the province’s municipalities — representing the majority of the registered population — had to approve incorporation. If any province failed to meet these requirements, the rest could continue the process without it. Choosing this easy path had the drawback that the new Autonomous Community would begin with only limited powers and would have to wait at least five years (Article 148) before even beginning to negotiate further transfers.

If the politicians of the future community could not or did not want to wait to manage education, labour, social security, or even have their own public television and radio channels, they could choose the difficult path (Article 151). This was similar to the first, but instead of two-thirds of the municipalities, it required three-quarters — and, crucially, it had to be approved by an absolute majority of the citizens of each province in a referendum. To understand politicians’ fear of the popular vote (something that hasn’t changed over time), it’s worth noting — even if it interrupts our narrative — that only one of today’s seventeen Autonomous Communities chose Article 151 for its creation: Andalusia (in fact, the region’s holiday on February 28 commemorates its referendum).

Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country managed to bypass the strict requirements of Article 151 while still requesting all powers without waiting five years, thanks to their pro-independence politicians in the Cortes securing the inclusion of a note at the end of the Constitution (Transitional Provision Two) stating that, since they had already approved autonomy statutes in referendums during the Second Republic, there was no need to hold another referendum. This caused great controversy — technically, two categories of Autonomous Communities had been created — and stirred discontent throughout Spain, adding pressure to the already complex political situation of the Transition. Some even began “looking for their sabres to rattle.” In any case, ordinary people didn’t seem to care much about the technicalities of autonomy, as only 8% of voters opposed it.

Official poster for the municipal elections

The Constitution specified that, before the provinces could vote, new municipal and provincial elections had to be held. Adolfo Suárez called General Elections for March 1 and Municipal Elections for April 3, 1979. The result was that, nationally and regionally, the UCD again won the General Elections (in Ávila, once again, it won all three possible seats). However, in the first democratic Municipal Elections in 46 years, thanks to the absence of electoral districts, the left managed to win many important town halls through PSOE–PCE agreements. A video broadcast by TVE a few days after the elections provides a very interesting summary of the events.

In our region, although the UCD won a large majority of deputies and senators in the Cortes and Provincial Councils, the balance of power between left and right was levelled because the PSOE took control of the town halls of Valladolid and Salamanca. Without the approval of these municipalities, Castile and León could not become a community.

Thus, on June 9, a meeting was held in Salamanca to update the General Council of Castile and León with the new councillors elected in the previous elections. Due to the centrist majority in the Council, Reol Tejada was easily re-elected President. Everything seemed fine until the matter arose of who would be the minority representative from each province. The UCD’s attempt to have the representatives from Soria and Zamora be an independent senator and a member of the Democratic Coalition, respectively, caused PSOE councillors to walk out of the meeting and later the General Council altogether.

Without socialist support, the Castilian-Leonese autonomy process was completely stalled. Everyone expected the UCD to make a move to restore consensus, but its internal situation was no better. Among its politicians — as in the Transition in general — there was everything: people excited by the new freedom; opportunists looking for a chance; more or less nostalgic Francoists; former local bosses fearful of losing their power; and individuals with a genuine desire for change. Add to this the vast sums of money at stake, and it’s easy to understand the origin of its internal conflicts. When the centrists began negotiating the PSOE’s return to the Council, the unity of the UCD broke down in the most unexpected way.

El Adelantado: Withdrawal of Segovian parliamentarians

On October 15, a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held in Burgos. While councillors waited for the Burgos hosts to arrive, the Interior Councillor, Modesto Fraile — a staunch defender of the role of Provincial Councils (his critics preferred to call him a defender of provincial bossism), deputy for Segovia, and UCD leader in that province — flew into a rage and left the Burgos Provincial Council Chamber, claiming it was unacceptable for the Burgos hosts — remember, from his own party — to make those who had travelled to Burgos wait, when they should have greeted them at the door. Two days later, Fraile held a press conference announcing that Segovia’s parliamentarians from his party were withdrawing from the Council and intended to start the process of making Segovia an independent Autonomous Community. He cited a new Valladolid centralism and that Segovian proposals had been ignored. No one — outside Segovia — took Don Modesto seriously (it was well known his anger was due to the distribution of funds from the Duero Hydrographic Confederation), and his move was seen as an attempt to perpetuate himself as a local boss. But the damage was done, and the press began to speculate about a possible breakup of Castile and León into several small, weak regions in the future autonomous Spain: one formed by León, Salamanca, and Zamora; another by Segovia, Ávila, and Soria; and several possible combinations of the remaining provinces — the most discussed bets being Santander and Palencia on one side, and Valladolid, Burgos, and Logroño on the other.

Breakup of Segovia, October 1979

The outlook could not have been worse for those hoping for a Castilian-Leonese Autonomous Community. To the initial absence of Logroño and Santander and León’s indecision, was now added Segovia’s withdrawal. The PSOE had also abandoned the process, and Alianza Popular was completely opposed. The UCD’s internal crisis paralysed any negotiation attempts, and, to make matters worse, at that time, threats of breakaway movements began to appear within the provinces themselves. On one hand, there was Basque pressure to take Treviño from Burgos; on the other, mobilisations began in El Bierzo to form a new province and join Galicia. Most worrying of all, some town councils had already begun voting to join the region, meaning the six-month deadline set by the Constitution was already running, with less than four months left to reach a general agreement. The personal and party interests of a few had brought the project to a critical crossroads. The dream of an autonomous Castile and León was fading fast, and very few believed it could be achieved.

Sources:
La Comunidad Autonómica de La Rioja en el Proceso Autonómico Español (1975-1996), Ignacio Granado Higelmo
El Adelantado de Segovia, 16 de octubre de 1976, página 6 y 18 de octubre de 1976, página 3
Fuerzas políticas en el proceso autonómico de Castilla y León. Mariano González Clavero. Tesis doctoral. UVa, 2002
XXV años de autonomía en Castilla y León. Pablo Pérez López, José-Vidal Pelaz López, Mariano González Clavero. Cortes de Castilla y León, 2008.
El regionalismo en Castilla y León. Julio Valdeón Baruque. Universidad de Valladolid

Images:
Elections 1979
Elections poster 1979
Segovia